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Abstract
Both domestic and international terrorist organizations employ guerrilla
warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures. Thus, the ability to identify
and defeat the members of these organizations, cripple their
infrastructures, and disrupt their financial resources lies in the
understanding of modern guerrilla warfare as it develops in the twenty-
first century within the United States.3 The forms of asymmetric
warfare4 adopted by domestic and international terrorist groups alike is
no longer intended to gain simple media exposure or governmental
manipulation; they want to make an overpowering impact by causing
massive loss of life and severe damage to infrastructure and are often
motivated by religious imperatives and political goals. As terrorism
analyst Stephen Flynn has observed, "Throughout the 20th century
[Americans] were able to treat national security as essentially an out-of-
body experience. When confronted by threats, [America] dealt with them
on the turf of our allies or our adversaries. Aside from the occasional
disaster and heinous crime, civilian life [in the United States] has been
virtually terror-free." With the turn of the twenty-first century, terrorist
operations have become more prevalent in the United States and are
taking shape in the form of modern guerrilla warfare, thus creating new
challenges for federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. After
reviewing the origin and nature of these challenges, this article will offer
some suggestions for countering guerilla warfare in the United States.
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Guerilla Warfare & Law 
Enforcement: Combating the 21st 
Century Terrorist Cell within the 
U.S.
By Richard J. Hughbank
"The mind of the enemy and the will of his leaders is a target of far more 
importance than the bodies of his troops."
Samuel B. Griffith II, On Guerrilla Warfare, 19611
Introduction
Both domestic and international terrorist organizations employ guerrilla 
warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures.2 Thus, the ability to identify 
and defeat the members of these organizations, cripple their infrastruc-
tures, and disrupt their financial resources lies in the understanding of 
modern guerrilla warfare as it develops in the twenty-first century within 
the United States.3 The forms of asymmetric warfare4 adopted by domes-
tic and international terrorist groups alike is no longer intended to gain 
simple media exposure or governmental manipulation; they want to make 
an overpowering impact by causing massive loss of life and severe damage 
to infrastructure and are often motivated by religious imperatives and 
political goals.5 As terrorism analyst Stephen Flynn has observed, 
"Throughout the 20th century [Americans] were able to treat national 
security as essentially an out-of-body experience. When confronted by 
threats, [America] dealt with them on the turf of our allies or our adver-
saries. Aside from the occasional disaster and heinous crime, civilian life 
[in the United States] has been virtually terror-free."6 With the turn of the 
twenty-first century, terrorist operations have become more prevalent in 
the United States and are taking shape in the form of modern guerrilla 
warfare, thus creating new challenges for federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies. After reviewing the origin and nature of these chal-
lenges, this article will offer some suggestions for countering guerilla war-
fare in the United States.
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Terrorist Operations within the United States
According to a book by Harvey Kushner and Bart Davis, Islamic extremist 
groups have been plotting within the borders of the United States for 
decades, originating with an exclusive network of educated leaders even-
tually known as "Mullahs."7 They note that this "secret Islamic network" 
was formed during the mid-1980s "when a tightly knit group of Islamic 
radicals attended the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical State 
University in Greensboro."8 After years of planning, recruiting, and train-
ing in decentralized terrorist cells located throughout the country, "[t]he 
founding members of the secret Islamic terror network executed a long-
range plan: raise money to fund terrorist activities; support Arab and 
Muslim demonstrations against our government's foreign policy and its 
support for Israel; infiltrate our political, economic, and military system 
to conduct espionage and to buy influence; and use our universities to set 
up fronts for terrorist organizations, because our academia's commitment 
to Free Speech and tolerance of diversity will protect them."9 
In an effort to gain a more thorough understanding of terrorism, recog-
nize who the terrorists are, and contend with why Americans have been 
attacked in their own sanctuaries, a growing cadre of academics and secu-
rity professionals have recently begun developing the field of terrorism 
and counterterrorism studies. However, one of the challenges yet to be 
overcome in this field is the need for a common definition. As one scholar 
has observed, "[W]e seek to define terrorism so as to be better able to cope 
with it, [but we] cannot begin to counter effectively that which we are 
unable to fully comprehend or agree on as to its nature."10 This lack of a 
universal definition poses issues in identifying, defending against, and 
ultimately defeating terrorist acts in the War on Terrorism.
Not only is it imperative that commonly accepted definitions of domestic 
and international terrorism exist, it is equally important to understand 
the methods of terrorist warfare and how they are actually conducted as 
well as what type of individuals—even among U.S. citizens—would join a 
cause that uses terrorism to achieve seemingly unobtainable objectives. 
As Benjamin Netanyahu—a former soldier in an elite antiterrorist unit in 
the Israeli Army and former prime minister of Israel—has noted, "The 
current breed of interlocking domestic and international terrorists is cer-
tainly not to be taken lightly. They know the West well and have devel-
oped strategies designed to take advantage of all its weaknesses."11 
Identifying the enemies' tactics and their motivational means for execut-
ing such heinous acts of political- and religious-based violence against an 
innocent civilian population will prove invaluable in the fight against 
domestic and international terrorism within the United States.
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Guerrilla Warfare Tactics
Tactics that have been successfully employed by small guerrilla-fighting 
forces for centuries are quickly becoming a serious problem, as domestic 
and international terrorist groups are utilizing stand-off, overt (high pro-
file), and covert (low profile) tactics to accomplish their end state with lit-
tle regard for those outside their organizations. This type of terrorist-
oriented asymmetric warfare is currently used all over the world, even 
though such a strategy rarely leads to the type of complete victory envi-
sioned by its adherents. Understanding guerrilla warfare requires the rec-
ognition of how terrorist cells operate within their political and religious 
ideologies and within their varying environmental battlefields.
According to historians Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, guerrilla 
warfare has historically been viewed as
 . . . a war of the masses, a war of the people. The guerrilla band 
[has been] an armed nucleus, the fighting vanguard of the people. 
It draws great force from the mass of the people themselves. 
Guerrilla warfare [has been] used by the side which is supported 
by a majority but which possesses a much smaller number of 
arms for use in defense against oppression.12
Guerilla leaders such as Mao Tse-tung in China, Ernesto "Che" Guevera in 
Latin America, and Carlos Marighella in Brazil, have revolutionized the 
art of small-unit warfare against larger and more adequately resourced 
opponents. Their decentralized campaign tactics have led to many victo-
ries over mighty armies and have eventually been adopted by many ter-
rorist groups such as the Baader-Meinhoff Gang (later known as the Red 
Faction Army) operating in West Germany.13
Guerrilla warfare has become the principal design from which terrorist 
cells are shaping their operations from preparation to recruitment to exe-
cution. It has historically been a proven blueprint for various levels of tac-
tical success and always provides the terrorist an opportunity to launch 
"himself against the conditions of the reigning institutions at a particular 
moment and dedicate himself with all the vigor that circumstances permit 
to breaking the mold of these institutions."14 As Mao Tse-tung wrote 
many years ago, "A trained and disciplined guerrilla is much more than a 
patriotic peasant, workman, or student armed with an antiquated . . . 
homemade bomb. His indoctrination begins even before he is taught to 
shoot accurately, and it is unceasing. The end product is an intensely loyal 
and politically alert fighting man."15 
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Twenty-First Century Terrorism as Guerilla Warfare
Domestic and international terrorist groups located within the United 
States are demonstrating the various guerrilla warfare techniques of old 
as they are setting out to achieve their political and religious objectives. 
From the development of the organization through the execution of the 
attack, these groups are organized in a manner—and utilize tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures—consistent with the operational phases of a tra-
ditional insurgency. These offensive measures are initiated whenever the 
opportunity for power, control, and socioeconomic influence favor the 
aggressor. Other operational fundamentals include influencing the need 
to defend multiple potential targets, the massive consumption of critical 
resources, sacrificing counter (offensive) measures, and the loss of politi-
cal and law enforcement initiatives. In essence, insurgents seek to reduce 
resources and diminish any willingness to protect civilian communities 
through attrition and exhaustion.16 One last and extremely critical impact 
could include the alienation of (local) communities toward law enforce-
ment officials and local and federal governments.
Guerilla warfare groups generally organize their activities around seven 
areas: preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, build-up, 
combat employment, and demobilization. Each is described in more 
detail below.
Preparation
Terrorist groups first look for a location from which to base their opera-
tions and begin recruiting. Location is critical, as they require an environ-
ment conducive to recruiting as well as privacy for planning their attacks. 
Community selection and socioeconomic structure are two critical factors 
in the choice of location. Like the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in North-
ern Ireland, terrorist groups form decentralized cells that consist of a 
select few individuals who can blend into an urbanized community and 
begin the recruiting process. The members of these sleeper cells17 will 
blend into their chosen society by obtaining jobs, paying bills, and acting 
and speaking like the indigenous population within the neighborhood for 
months and years while preparing and recruiting for the next attack. The 
socioeconomic structure of a community is crucial to a cell's intelligence 
preparation in a given area of operation.
As Daniel Pipes notes, although most would expect the militant Islamic to 
entice those individuals from the lower end of the social strata, "research 
finds precisely the opposite [to be] true. To the extent that economic fac-
tors explain who becomes Islamic, they point to the fairly well off, not the 
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poor . . . . Those who back militant Islamic organizations also tend to be 
well off. They come more often from the richer city than the poorer coun-
tryside."18
Initial Contact
Over time, the organizational structure begins to take shape, and posi-
tions within the cell are filled with recruits from the local community. In 
order to recruit locals to meet their specific needs, cell members set clan-
destine operations in motion to begin identifying those who meet the spe-
cial needs within a particular cell. As Tse-tung observed, guerrilla 
warfare's "basic element is man, and man is more complex than any of his 
machines."19 While looking for those individuals who might meet their 
strategic and tactical needs for future terrorist operations, cell members 
integrate themselves into the daily lives of their target population with 
absolute discretion, giving the appearance of the average U.S. citizen 
residing in "Anytown, U.S.A." Marighella believed that urban guerillas 
would have neither the means nor the capability to maintain a job for very 
long, forcing them to begin expropriation tactics over long periods of 
time. He also spoke of the importance for guerilla insurgents to learn how 
to live among the indigenous people in their operational area, employing 
extreme discretion as they gradually integrate into their new environ-
ment. Once they have comfortably maneuvered themselves into the every-
day events of their chosen community, then, and only then, will they 
begin their initial contact.
Infiltration
Infiltration is defined as complete submersion into a society. In places 
such as Dearborn, Michigan; Brooklyn, New York; Hancock, New York; 
and Buena Vista, Colorado (the last two cities refer directly to cells of the 
Jaamat ul-Faruqa movement), Islamic jihad extremists have infiltrated 
and begun recruiting, training, and plotting their next terrorist attack 
against the United States—all in the name of Islamic purification through 
violence and destruction. A critical factor for the development of the cell's 
structure in this stage is the process of isolating promising recruits in U.S. 
society who may harbor ill feelings toward either the current government 
or Christians and Jews. They begin to quietly spread their religious and 
political beliefs as a more acceptable alternative to the democratic 
governments in the evil empire of the Western world. Christianity is 
dismissed in their eyes as a lesser religion, or no religion at all, and the 
Islamic faith is praised as the only righteous path to Allah (Arabic for 
God), as revealed through the last prophet Muhammad and his universal 
and timeless message.
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Additionally, these groups engage in criminal acts such as fraud, burglary, 
racketeering, and illegal use and distribution of drugs (narco-terrorism) 
in an effort to financially provide for future training and tactical opera-
tions. Other methods of gathering funds to further facilitate their jihad 
are through the production and sale of militant Islamic propaganda dur-
ing their teachings, training, and prayer meetings.
Organization
Once the infiltration phase in an area of operations has been established 
and deemed satisfactory to the needs of the newly formed insurgent 
group, the terrorist cell's organization begins to take shape. The tradi-
tional guerrilla forces of Afghanistan, Brazil, China, and Vietnam grew in 
size equaling two hundred to one thousand-person units, but terrorist 
cells forming in the United States are significantly smaller and "stove-
piped" in design, mostly due to the urban terrain and environments in 
which they have chosen to conduct their operations. This organizational 
technique is better known as decentralization, or networked decentraliza-
tion. With decentralized cells working toward a common objective, those 
caught during the commission of an illegal act are unable to give any 
operational intelligence on other sections of their cell or on the existence 
of other cells. A terrorist cell evolves in both size and sophistication as 
new recruits enter their training and progress to any of the cell's three 
organizational forces: auxiliary, intelligence, or operational.
Build-up
Although the name of this phase implies there is a massing or increase in 
size of the cell, the size will vary with each location (and sociological 
environment), organization, and intended mission. As stated earlier, 
unlike the traditionally sizable guerrilla forces dating back to Guevara, 
Marighella, and Tse-tung, twenty-first-century terrorist cells located 
within the United States are organized in much smaller and more elusive 
elements in order to suit their needs for covert operations at every phase 
of their insurgency. Furthermore, recruits with special skills are also 
examined more heavily when considered for recruitment, unlike the 
average guerrilla fighter in previous wars. As Loveman and Davies 
observe, drawing on the doctrine originally espoused by Guevara, 
"Guerilla warfare, the basis of the struggle of a people to redeem itself, has 
diverse characteristics, different facets, even though the essential 
liberation remains the same."20 Understanding this philosophy is critical 
for law enforcement agencies throughout the country that must identify 
and disrupt terrorist cells within their jurisdictions. Guevara's teachings 
still hold true in the forming and training of both domestic and 
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international terrorist organizations located in the United States. Another 
important parallel between guerrilla warfare of old and today's terrorist 
cells is that this form of war "is a war of the masses, a war of the people."21 
While terrorist cells will utilize this phase to further develop their 
organizations, they will only have a select few who are deceived by their 
fatwa22 to attack and kill other Americans in their own country.
Combat Employment
Once a cell has determined that the time has come to conduct "combat" 
operations, plans will become actions set into motion with finite preci-
sion, leaving little room for identification or interception by first respond-
ers. The asymmetric actions of typical guerilla warfare are a product of 
months of detailed planning, resourcing, organizing, and rehearsing. 
Although there are varying social-strata levels joining and participating in 
terrorist acts, make no mistake that the delivery platform of this horrific 
weapon of terrorism will result from highly trained and dedicated Islamic 
jihadists who truly believe their actions are righteous and for the better-
ment of the Islamic nation.
Demobilization
Although the term demobilization infers that terrorist forces are maneu-
vering from wartime to a peacetime position through the disbanding of 
their organization, this is not the posture referenced here. Demobilization 
during guerrilla warfare is more likely to occur in the form of a dismem-
bering of the operational cell responsible for the actual terrorist attack—
that is, if the members do not die for their cause (e.g., homicide bomb-
ings) or get caught during the commission of their criminal act. It could 
also be concluded that the parent cell itself could stand down and relocate 
to another area or region if the situation proved dangerous to its existence 
and execution of ibn Ladin's fatwa. The organization's decentralized 
operational control allows the separate cells to function independently, 
providing uninterrupted and continuous operations. In order to success-
fully terminate a local cell's operational status, a way must found to demo-
bilize the actual base facilities where they recruit, train, plan, and project 
terror against their intended targets.
This key cell adjustment will not be undertaken lightly by terrorist organi-
zations, as it involves several critical moving pieces not only in terms of 
the destruction of its current base of operations, but also in the process of 
executing the first five operational phases over what could prove a lengthy 
and costly amount of time. Therefore, if a cell cannot be identified and 
totally eradicated by a country's intelligence and law enforcement agen-
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cies, the next best option may be to cause its members to believe that they 
must demobilize and move to another location.
Strategic Challenges for Countering Guerilla 
Warfare
Over two hundred years after the first Spanish guerrillas, terrorist groups 
are still thriving on the principles that have made guerrilla warfare such a 
tremendous and potentially successful tactic of fighting more with less. 
However, there are several critical differences in how modern guerrilla 
warfare is executed in the United States today, as compared with other 
countries in the past:
1. The foundation of modern terrorist cells could be either domestic or 
international in nature (that is, not always "homegrown"). This might 
appear irrelevant at first, but while most domestic terrorist groups are 
discontented from the government, they are not necessarily looking to 
cause massive loss of life (Timothy McVeigh's terrorist attack of the 
Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City is clearly an exception). 
International cells consisting of militant Islamic groups conducting 
guerrilla operations in another country are not only looking to have an 
impact on the government, they are also plotting to attack soft targets 
with the intent of destroying critical economic infrastructure and cause 
enormous loss of life in order to carry out the following fatwa issued by 
ibn Ladin on February 23, 1998: "The ruling to kill the Americans and 
their allies—civilians and military—is an individual duty for every Mus-
lim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."23 
2. While the cause is against a perceived oppressive government, it is not, 
nor will it ever be, supported by a trained, professional army consti-
tuted of U.S. citizens. Guerrilla armies in other countries have always 
depended on a "regular" army to sustain their governmental opposi-
tion, and the lack of popular local support will ultimately minimize the 
opportunities for guerrilla-style warfare to win the wars of either attri-
tion or annihilation, especially in a foreign country.
3. Terrorists are fighting for "religious ideologies" rather than for "civili-
zations." In a fight for religious ideological pursuits, the identified bat-
tlefield must contain multiple supporters in these perceived ideologies 
in order to successfully sustain the cause and have any hope for long-
term success. While there are over one thousand two hundred mosques 
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with some two million American Muslim participants located through-
out the United States,24 clearly very few members have the desire to 
express their religious and political beliefs through ibn Ladin's fatwa.
4. As Therese Delpeche notes, terrorist acts will "contribute to reshaping 
international relations,"25 and not just in the immediate area in which 
they are conducting operations. If terrorism was to successfully manip-
ulate U.S. citizens and subdue or defeat the government of the United 
States, every other country in the world would feel the ripple effect of 
the most powerful nation in the world collapsing to a weaker enemy, 
and other economies would ultimately face unrecoverable losses as 
well as an onslaught of follow-on terrorist attacks. The world will not 
stand by and watch terrorism erode the United States to the point of 
defeat.
5. According to Delpeche, "The boundaries between military and civil 
defense are being blurred. The increasing need to protect civilians from 
terrorists attacks . . . will lead the most-developed countries to give a 
new priority to civil defense, making it harder for the terrorist[s] to 
strike in the middle of cities and easier for [the] government to deal 
with limited unconventional attacks."26 Governments today are better 
equipped with intelligence-gathering techniques and technological 
defense mechanisms to fight modern guerilla fighters. The freedom of 
movement within a city or state has been limited by these modern 
counterinsurgency techniques, causing terrorist cells to move at a 
slower pace and spend more time planning and training for their next 
attack. The greater the degree of precision placed on terrorists 
increases the opportunity for local law enforcement agencies and other 
first responders to act or react to their attacks and potentially prevent 
an attack from occurring.
Closing the Training Camps, Mosques, Compounds, 
and Schools
While militant Islamism has been a force to contend with throughout the 
world for many years, it is also becoming more prevalent in the United 
States. According to Kushner and Davis:
It isn't an accident that many U.S. mosques have become append-
ages of worldwide jihad against the West. The number of Muslims 
coming here rose rapidly after the United States revised immigra-
tion laws in the mid-1960s. The number of mosques and Islamic 
community centers grew over that time, by some estimates from 
Hughbank: Guerilla Warfare & Law Enforcement: Combating the 21st Century Te
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
Journal of Strategic Security
48
about fifty at the end of World War II to more than twelve hun-
dred today. The role of the mosque has also changed—from 
Americanized "cultural clubs" of earlier immigrants to conserva-
tive, religion-oriented institutions that manipulate the national 
and cultural identities of new immigrants in an effort to avoid 
their inclusion in mainstream America.27
These terrorism analysts also point to a common thread that emerges 
from recent cases brought against confirmed or alleged Islamic terror 
cells in the United States—the connection between the terror cells' mem-
bers and a local mosque.28 State and federal law enforcement agencies 
must initiate and maintain aggressive intelligence-gathering operations 
with varying profiles, specifically targeting those individuals and organi-
zations where militant Muslims teach others to execute ibn Ladin's fatwa. 
"Islamberg," a training camp utilized by the Jamaat ul-Faruqa move-
ment in Hancock, New York, is a prime example of how militant Islamic 
teachings have penetrated the fabric of the United States' society and 
begun the recruiting and transformation of Islamic Americans against 
their democratic government. As Cooper notes, "The youngest members 
of Islamic society are being exposed to intolerance and hate in the Islamic 
religious schools from the earliest grades on."29 
Delpeche recently observed that having the ability to contain violence has 
always been the key to security.30 Stephen Flynn agrees, arguing that
 . . . the threat is ongoing, and [the United States] must be doing 
more right now to limit the consequences of future acts of terror. 
It will take time to implement well-conceived, layered security 
measures that protect the critical foundations of [the American] 
society. [Americans] have to make judgments about [their] most 
immediate vulnerabilities, identify what stop-gap protective 
measures [they] can implement in a hurry, and develop and 
exercise plans to guide [their] response when the next attack 
materialize.31
Conclusion
Terrorism, by its nature, seeks out and exploits its opponents' weak-
nesses. Terrorist cells will only execute when they believe the tactical 
advantage is clearly theirs and that, as Tse-tung dictates, "chances for vic-
tory are weighted heavily in their favor."32 The asymmetric warfare tactics 
practiced by domestic and international terrorist organizations have 
achieved some success over the years in various countries throughout the 
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world. Arguably the most powerful and influential nation in the free 
world, the United States must refuse to concede to such heinous acts of 
violence, as its second- and third-order impacts could prove detrimental 
to the political and economic status of nations throughout the world. As 
Stephen Flynn observes:
The reason that catastrophic terrorism holds such potential as a 
means to wage war on the United States is not simply because 
these attacks can inflict damage to systems we depend on; it is 
because our enemies have good reason to believe that a successful 
act of terror on American soil will trigger a reaction which the 
U.S. Government exacerbates localized destruction with substan-
tial self-inflicted national and even global costs.33
In order to pursue a successful counteroffensive against terrorism, the 
United States must analyze previous defense strategies in overseas areas 
of operation and begin to concentrate on the varying phases of a terrorist 
organization's movement within its own borders, as well as on its 
understanding of what Kushner and Davis describe as "the terrorist's 
language, culture, history, methods, and psychology."34 Furthermore, the 
leaders of this democratic nation should consider how they might prevent 
others from joining these militant Muslim organizations as willing 
participants by improving the socioeconomic welfare of those subject to 
easy recruitment.
We are at a point in our history where "timidity" will prove an undesirable 
and fatal flaw in the defense of this nation. The days of Americans feeling 
safe within their geographical borders has come to an end, as militant 
Islamic jihadists penetrate the United States' societal footprint and live 
among their prey. Outdated security against the average criminal element 
will neither prevent nor protect against modern-day criminal attacks by a 
well-funded and highly trained terrorist cell. According to Flynn's analy-
sis, "[Americans] must create the kind of structure that widens the 
breadth and quality of civic participation in making America safe. The 
nation, not just the federal government, must be organized for the long, 
deadly struggle against terrorism."35 
The War on Terror has forced the United States to face its enemies on its 
own soil for the first time since the Civil War, thus forcing its strategies of 
defense to alter as it considers the long-term effects of both massive war-
time damage to infrastructure and loss of civilian life. The world is anx-
iously standing by to see just how effective the United States is in 
handling terrorism inside its own borders as well as in other foreign coun-
tries, as its actions (or lack thereof) will forever shape the diplomatic and 
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economic policies sustained between itself and other governments around 
the world. The United States cannot afford to lose this war.
A version of this article previously appeared as a chapter in a book pub-
lished by: Forest, et. al. (June 2007). Countering Terrorism and Insur-
gency in the 21st Century [Three Volumes]: International Perspectives. 
Chapter titled "Guerilla Warfare and Law Enforcement: Combating the 
21st Century Terrorist Cell within the United States." Praeger Security 
International, Chapter 12, pp. 235–252.
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